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INTRODUCTION
In 2002, one year after the Taliban regime effectively stemmed the cultivation of opium, Afghanistan's interim government witnessed the largest opium harvest in the country's history.
This occurred in spite of the government's countrywide ban on opium poppy cultivation.
In 2001, the United Nations (UN) recorded Afghanistan's opium cultivation at 184 metric tons, down 3091 metric tons from 2000. 1 In 2002, production resumed at high levels reaching 3400 metric tons. 2 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2003 report indicates that Afghanistan produced 3,600 metric tons that year, up six percent from the previous year. 3 Because of revived complicity in opium production among the provincial warlords, remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban, Afghanistan has once again produced three-quarters of the world's illicit opium, and if left unabated will affect post conflict reconstruction.
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Why has Afghanistan re-emerged as the world's largest source of illicit opium, and what implications will it have on the country's reconstruction? An examination of Afghanistan's historical connection with opium will explain why opium cultivation has re-emerged as a pernicious threat in the post Taliban Afghanistan. In order to eliminate the opium market in Afghanistan, the US must employ a multifaceted strategy which incorporates all elements of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) to expand the Afghan government's central authority and legitimacy. The strategy must focus on: weaning
Afghanistan from its socio-economic dependence on opium; expanding central government authority throughout Afghanistan; recognizing a cost savings at the global level and; an Information Operations campaign that addresses how growing poppy is un-Islamic and supports criminal and anti-government activity. This systematic approach will help break the cycle of opium production and significantly curtail the global narcotics market.
THE EARLY YEARS OF OPIUM
According to Alfred McCoy, "since the sixteenth century, when recreational opium eating was first developed, Central Asia had been a self-sufficient drug market. 
SOVIET INTERVENTION
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 animated several countries, notably the US and Pakistan, to assist the Afghan resistance. Soviet influence over the Marxist government of Afghanistan and potential threats to Pakistan's territorial integrity concerned both
Pakistan and the US. 9 "With a hostile India on one side and a Soviet-occupied Afghanistan on the other, Pakistan was in danger of physical isolation," 10 and a potential target for Soviet invasion in the future. Pakistan was also fretful over the influx of Pashtun and Blauchi refugees from Afghanistan and the inevitable alliances with their tribesmen in the NWFP of Pakistan. The
Pakistanis viewed this as a security concern that could one day threaten the integrity of the Durand Agreement. 11 The US concern was geostrategic in nature because Washington viewed the Soviet invasion as a threat to the Persian Gulf oil fields.
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RE-BIRTH OF AFGHANISTAN'S OPIUM ECONOMY
At the behest of Pakistan, the US agreed to support a nascent Afghan insurgency to expel the Soviet military from Afghanistan. In 1980 the Carter administration offered Pakistan $400 million to assist Afghan resistance. Pakistan rejected the assistance as "peanuts" and began to fund the insurgency with money from wealthy Afghan refugees that had made their money in opium cultivation within the NWFP. 13 The Reagan administration eventually provided a threebillion dollar military aid package and in 1981, which prompted Pakistan to ban the cultivation of opium in the NWFP. 14 The NWFP however, remained a major conduit for opium from
Afghanistan to Europe and America.
Pakistan recognized seven Afghan resistance groups collectively known as the mujahideen. 15 Sunni was the religious affiliation of each group, four of them Islamist and the other three traditionalist. The Islamist's were radical and favored a unified Afghanistan that practiced fundamental Islamic principles, while the traditionalists preferred national liberation.
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Of the seven groups, Pakistan convinced the US to support Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-iIslami, since it was the best trained, organized, and most disciplined of the mujahideen groups. Government will make every effort to achieve complete elimination of illicit drug cultivation before the set target in areas where alternative livelihoods have been made sufficiently available • Countering the trafficking, processing, and distribution of narcotic and psychotropic substances into, within and out of the country through vigorous interdiction and prosecution measures. Similarly strict measures should be taken against the trafficking, use and distribution of precursor chemicals into and within the country • Increasing efforts to forfeit drug generated assets and checking money laundering
• Reducing the problematic use of legal and illegal substances through prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and social integration • Enhancing regional and international cooperation to facilitate the elimination of illegal drug production and trafficking, rehabilitation and social integration 30 While the United States' post-conflict responsibility is to build the ANA and fight terrorism in Afghanistan, it cannot achieve total success without some focus on the drug war. According to John Walters, Director for White House Office of Drug Control Policy, "…drug cultivation and trafficking (in Afghanistan) are undermining the rule of law and putting money in the pockets of terrorists…" that we are trying to neutralize. For this reason, the United States supports multilateral efforts to reduce the reviving illegal opium and heroin trade in Afghanistan. 31 The
United States has implemented the following goals in an effort to assist the United Kingdom and Afghan government combat the illicit opiate problem:
• Minimizing poppy cultivation by creating alternative livelihoods and cash-for-work programs with major sponsors, the UN and the International Financial Institutions in poppy-growing areas.
• Employing a good public affairs campaign to assure participation
• Establishing and strengthening Afghan law enforcement agencies to help interdict shipments and to destroy opium markets, stockpiles, and distribution networks • Strengthening regional cooperation on drug interdiction using the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Operation Containment and United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) programs • Initiating and rebuilding Afghan civil society and institutions to enable them to support programs reducing production of opium and to encourage anti-drug messages through public campaigns to prevent, drug use/abuse, and to instill support for rule of law However, production cost was estimated at $430 per hectare, resulting in a net lost of $370 per hectare. 35 It is clear that farmers are not making sufficient enough income for the work they do harvesting wheat, and this is one of the factors contributing to the growth of opium poppy production. 36 Afghan farmers are deeply religious and devout Muslims that understand it is unIslamic to grow poppy, but feel they have little choice if they are to survive economically.
Consider the following comments from Mr. Abduallah, an Afghan farmer near Kabul:
I know that poppy cultivation is not good, but last year, my income from 0. The most daunting factor contributing to the re-emergence of the country's opium economy is the prevalent state of lawlessness which endangers progress in reconstruction. The current security situation plaguing Afghanistan is reminiscent of the lawless days of warlorddominated mayhem and inter-ethnic suspicion. Regional warlords and anti-government militia are once again vying for power and intimidating the populace. As in the past, these groups protect opium cultivation and use the crop proceeds to finance their power bases. The 2003 "poppy crop seems to be financing a fresh proliferation of weapons among the warlords." 41 To make matters worse, drug experts are finding evidence that profits from Afghanistan's opium economy are reviving the Taliban insurgency and the al Qaeda network. 42 Afghanistan's current counter narcotics law-enforcement activity is incapable of dealing with country's narcotics problem. More importantly, the ANA is not capable of dealing with the country's unstable security posture. Even though the ANA's reported strength is between 7,000 to 10,000 soldiers, its attrition rate is so high it will not have a significant security presence for some time.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LOYA JIRGA
Any long-term benefits from the current ITGA policies will fail to be realized as long as weak central authority persists, an aggressive opium eradication program along with alternative lucrative crops is not instituted, and more importantly, robust international support is not provided. On 4 January 2004, the ITGA approved a new constitution that for the first time established a democratic presidential system and two-chamber national assembly. While many praise the country's historic development, some believe that ethnic divisions will make implementation very difficult. Vikram Parekh, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group in Kabul, fears that regional factions will ultimately undermine support for the constitution. 44 His concern is that the process, which led to the creation of the Constitutional 
ALTERNATIVE CROPS
The UN unintentionally undermined the domestic wheat market by mismanagement of the alternative crops program. The current program must build flexibility into to the system to make allowances for domestic crops that recover from the three-year drought. Despite the abundant wheat harvest in 2003, Afghanistan's domestic wheat prices were undercut by surplus wheat imported by the UN. To make wheat production economically viable in the future, the United Nations must use domestic wheat to feed the general population before importing foreign sources of wheat. Now that Afghanistan is experiencing a surplus of wheat, the United Nations and international donors should sponsor its grain for export. There are world markets that can benefit from Afghan grain. The European Union will need to import millions of tons of grain through June 2004. 48 "Europe's wheat, maize and barley supplies are dwindling after spring droughts and a scorching summer heat wave shriveled harvests across the continent." 49 There is of course, always a need for grain in the famine stricken countries of Africa. Afghanistan as the leading exporter of grain will surely gain economically. Afghanistan was once a leading exporter of raisins, grapes, melons and other fruit before the 1999 drought. Perhaps the United Nations and international donors should focus on this niche market as alternative crops.
Subsidies for these alternative crops, however, are paramount in order to yield greater profits for farmers than the poppy market. Given the tremendous budgets the United States and
European States devote to combating drug trafficking, the money earmarked for subsidies, no matter how exorbitant, will likely be relatively small. Hence, expenditures aimed at eliminating the growth of opium will likely be much smaller than combating opium and its by product once on the market.
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
At the Tokyo conference held January [21] [22] 2002 Because the key to combating illicit opium lies at its source every effort should be made by the United States and international donors to provide President Kariza's government the necessary the financial assistance he needs to combat the illicit drug problem in his country.
CONCLUSION
Post Taliban Afghanistan has re-emerged as the world's leading source of illicit opium. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Diplomatically. The US must pressure neighboring states to close their borders to drug trafficking. Border closings will not completely shut down Afghanistan's opium market, but it will make it more difficult for traffickers to get their opium to processing labs in neighboring countries and onward. In addition to encouraging Pakistan to assist in the fight against terrorism, the United States must also press it to shut down its borders to Afghan warlords that use processing labs and storage facilities along the border of the NWFP. More importantly, the United States must work with the Afghan government to sever the warlords' financial base, which is partially responsible for keeping the country's opium economy prosperous. Information. The United States must assist the ITGA engage in an Information Operations (IO) campaign that hits at the heart of Afghan values. The Taliban was partially successful with reducing Afghanistan's opium production by declaring it un-Islamic to harvest. The ITGA should develop a similar campaign that not only focuses on how growing poppy is un-Islamic but how it also supports criminal and anti-government activity. As a complementary theme, a media campaign should stress the illegality of growing poppy and the idea that for a few pieces of silver a farmer can lose his soul to opium. The campaign should also assure the Afghan people that the United States, United Nations, NATO and other international donors will not abandon them before socioeconomic reforms are established through out Afghanistan.
Military. Because of the danger of sparking an uprising, the US-led coalition forces fighting terrorism should have a minimal role in counter drug operations. Their support should be limited to the destruction of opium labs and storage facilities that are encountered during combat operations, if intelligence links the sites to the Taliban or al Qaeda. The United States should also actively assist the Germans in the training of Afghan Police forces and consider the possibility of training a counter narcotics task force capable of executing eradication operations for the Central Government in order to accelerate law enforcement training.
Economic. The United Nations should establish a working group to study the costbenefits regarding crop subsidies to wean the Afghans off poppy cultivation. The working group should factor in the associated costs involved in domestic and international counter-drug and law enforcement activities. In the broader realm, seemingly exorbitant subsidies may prove less expensive than combating the drug market directly.
If needed reforms and an executable strategy to deal with the country's illicit opium economy fail to materialize, Afghanistan will remain the world's leading producer of heroin and participating members of the Bonn conference will fail to achieve post conflict reconstruction objectives. On the other hand, an achievable strategy will expand the government's central authority and will be a roadmap to abolishing Afghanistan's poppy cultivation and opium trade.
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